@parcel/rust-win32-x64-msvc

Problem

Security Development Lifecycle (SDL) is a group of enhanced compile-time checks that report common coding mistakes as errors, preventing them from reaching production. These checks minimize the number of security issues by enforcing strict memory access checks. They also prevent the use of hard-to-secure string and memory manipulation functions. To prove the binary has been compiled with these checks enabled, the compiler emits a special debug object. Removing the debug table eliminates this proof. Therefore, this check only applies to binaries that still have their debug tables.

Problem

Security Development Lifecycle (SDL) is a group of enhanced compile-time checks that report common coding mistakes as errors. These checks prevent the use of hard-to-secure memory manipulation functions. They enforce static memory access checks, and allow only the use of range-verified memory access functions. While these checks do not prevent every memory corruption issue by themselves, they do help reduce the likelihood.

Problem

Software developers use programming and design knowledge to build reusable software components. Software components are the basic building blocks for modern applications. Software consumed by an enterprise consists of hundreds, and sometimes even thousands of open source components. Software developers publish components they have authored to public repositories. While a new software project is a welcome addition to the open source community. it is not always prudent to indiscriminately use the latest components when building a commercial application. Irrespective of the software quality, the danger of using components that are rarely used to build applications lies in the fact that the software component may contain novel, currently undetected malicious code. Therefore, it is prudent to review software component behaviors and even try out software component in a sandbox, an environment meant for testing untrusted code.

Prevalence in npm community

No prevalence information at this time

Problem

Control Flow Guard (CFG/CFI) protects the code flow integrity by ensuring that dynamic calls are made only to vetted functions. Trusted execution paths rely on the ability of the operating system to build a list of valid function targets. Certain functions can intentionally be disallowed to prevent malicious code from deactivating vulnerability mitigation features. A list of such invalid function targets can include publicly exported symbols. Applications that enhance control flow integrity through export suppression rely on libraries to mark their publicly visible symbols as suppressed. This is done for all symbols that are considered to be sensitive functions, and to which access should be restricted. It is considered dangerous to mix applications that perform export suppression with libraries that do not.

Problem

Control Flow Guard (CFG/CFI) protects the code flow integrity by ensuring that indirect calls are made only to vetted functions. This mitigation protects dynamically resolved function targets by instrumenting the code responsible for transferring execution control. Higher-level programming languages implement structured exception handling by managing their own code flow execution paths. As such, they are subject to code flow hijacking during runtime. Language-specific exception handling mitigation enforces execution integrity by instrumenting calls to manage execution context switching. Any deviation from the known and trusted code flow paths will cause the application to terminate. This makes malicious code less likely to execute.