A name-squatting supply chain attack published on September 8, 2025 registered the npm package name "prebid" -- the natural short form of the widely-used "prebid.js" header bidding library -- under an unauthorized account, shipping a verbatim copy of the legitimate library's source code. Armando identified the package as malicious and confirmed that npm removed it. The package accumulated 234 downloads before takedown, targeting developers who typed "prebid" instead of "prebid.js".
Key Findings
- Malicious version: v10.9.1, published 2025-09-08; no clean predecessor exists under this package name
- Entry point: no install-time lifecycle hook; the attack vector is the package name itself -- developers who run
npm install prebid receive this impersonation instead of the legitimate library
- Targets: any npm user who attempts to install the well-known prebid.js header bidding library by its shortened name
- Evasion: the package ships the complete, unmodified source code of prebid.js@10.9.2, making it indistinguishable from the real library on superficial inspection
- Detection: Text.Trojan.SupplyChain (package.json); Archive-GZIP.Trojan.SupplyChain (prebid-10.9.1.tgz); Archive-TAR.Trojan.SupplyChain (prebid-10.9.1.tar)
Package Background
The legitimate "prebid.js" library is an open-source header bidding solution with a long publication history and a large community of advertising technology users. It is maintained by the Prebid organization at https://github.com/prebid/Prebid.js and published under the npm package name "prebid.js". The "prebid" npm name -- without the ".js" suffix -- was previously unclaimed or unregistered, leaving it open for abuse.
The attacker registered the "prebid" package name on September 8, 2025, the same day the malicious version was published. The package had 234 total downloads before npm removed it. It had no prior legitimate history; all versions under the "prebid" name are malicious.
Attack Analysis
The attack follows the name-squatting pattern: register a package name that is a plausible abbreviation or alternate form of an established, widely-known package, then ship the real library's code as contents. Developers who attempt to install prebid.js using the shortened name "prebid" -- a common mistake given how libraries are typically discussed by their short names -- would receive this package.
Armando found that the "prebid" package, published by the npm account "bgorsline" (bgorsline@gmail.com), contains a byte-for-byte copy of the prebid.js@10.9.2 codebase including the full dist/ build artifacts, src/ source files, and test suites. The package.json manifest names itself "prebid" with version "10.9.1" and claims the repository URL of the legitimate prebid/Prebid.js GitHub project -- a deliberate attempt to appear authentic.
The intel signal no-github-tag confirms that no corresponding git tag for v10.9.1 exists in the prebid/Prebid.js repository, because the attacker had no write access to that project. The publish event has no development activity to support it: the "prebid" package name had never existed before this attack.
The publisher account "bgorsline" is a single-purpose account with no legitimate history, no public GitHub presence, and no packages other than this one. After npm removed the package, the account's footprint was reduced to zero.
Malicious Files
package.json is the attack artifact. It claims the npm package name "prebid" -- the impersonation vehicle. The manifest lists the prebid/Prebid.js GitHub repository as its source, mimicking the appearance of an official distribution. The RL scanner classified this manifest as Text.Trojan.SupplyChain. No install scripts, postinstall hooks, or dependency injections were added; the name alone is the supply chain threat. This file carries no goodware candidates, confirming it is unique to the attack package.
prebid-10.9.1.tgz is the npm tarball artifact, classified Archive-GZIP.Trojan.SupplyChain. It is a container for the malicious package.json and all copied source files.
Recommendations
Developers and security teams should take the following steps:
- Identify exposure: Check whether
prebid v10.9.1 appears in your dependency tree, including transitive dependencies. Any pipeline that ran npm install while this version was current should be considered potentially affected. Note that the package name "prebid" differs from the legitimate "prebid.js"; search both your lock files and installed node_modules.
- Update immediately: If "prebid" (without ".js") appears in any package.json, remove it and replace with the correct "prebid.js" package published by the Prebid organization.
- Inspect affected systems: No known malicious payload was injected into the copied source code; however, any environment that installed this package from an unauthorized publisher should be reviewed for supply chain policy violations.
- Scan your software supply chain: Use Spectra Assure Community to check whether packages in your environment have been flagged.
Indicators of Compromise
Malicious Files
| Filename | SHA256 | Detection |
|---|
| prebid-10.9.1.tgz | 7c19b91291f8c2cded43253f5806afe81e0dc899fcd35b8a194a69fd841e648d | Archive-GZIP.Trojan.SupplyChain |
| package.json | 6bec837c84904757eb6b75c0947954fe3489e1ffce99007720c0f2cea5cbc2f2 | Text.Trojan.SupplyChain |
Network IOCs
| URL / IP | Purpose |
|---|
| None | This release ships only the copied prebid.js source; no attacker-controlled network endpoints are present in the package files |
Archive Hashes
| File | SHA256 |
|---|
| prebid-10.9.1.tgz | 7c19b91291f8c2cded43253f5806afe81e0dc899fcd35b8a194a69fd841e648d |
| prebid-10.9.1.tar | da257e7c84d08cb5542b9f2c0acc426cb81ad4a87bc8eae9891353d4464abd6c |