On September 8, 2025, the same day version 10.9.1 appeared, an attacker published a second release of the fake "prebid" npm package -- v10.9.2 -- under the same unauthorized account. Armando confirmed that this second version continues the same name-squatting supply chain attack against the legitimate prebid.js header bidding library, shipping the real library's source code under a confusingly similar package name. npm removed both versions.
Key Findings
- Malicious version: v10.9.2, published 2025-09-08; v10.9.1 of the same attacker-controlled package is equally malicious
- Entry point: no install-time lifecycle hook; the attack vector is the package name -- developers who run
npm install prebid receive this impersonation instead of the legitimate "prebid.js" library
- Targets: any npm user attempting to install the prebid.js header bidding library using its shortened name
- Evasion: the package ships the complete, unmodified source code of the legitimate prebid.js library, mirroring the real prebid/Prebid.js GitHub repository to appear authentic
- Detection: Text.Trojan.SupplyChain (package.json); Archive-GZIP.Trojan.SupplyChain (prebid-10.9.2.tgz); Archive-TAR.Trojan.SupplyChain (prebid-10.9.2.tar); Script-JS.Trojan.SupplyChain (prebid.js, utils.js -- goodware candidates from prebid.js@10.9.2; deferred to human analyst)
Package Background
The legitimate prebid.js library is a widely deployed open-source header bidding solution maintained by the Prebid organization at github.com/prebid/Prebid.js and published to npm as "prebid.js". The "prebid" npm name (without the ".js" suffix) was unclaimed prior to September 2025.
The attacker registered both "prebid" v10.9.1 and v10.9.2 on the same day -- a publish cluster indicating deliberate two-version strategy, possibly intended to give the impression of an active, versioned project. Both versions were removed by npm. The package had 234 total downloads across the entire "prebid" name before takedown.
Attack Analysis
Version 10.9.2 extends the v10.9.1 attack with an updated version number and a corresponding bump in the included prebid.js source content. Armando found that the "prebid" v10.9.2 package, published by bgorsline (bgorsline@gmail.com), contains a copy of the prebid.js library source matching prebid.js@10.9.2. The package.json manifest names itself "prebid" version "10.9.2" and references the legitimate prebid/Prebid.js GitHub repository.
Publishing two sequential versions (10.9.1 and 10.9.2) on the same day is an attacker technique to establish a version history that makes the package look maintained and follow legitimate release cadence. Both versions are covered by the same intel finding: publisher account "bgorsline" is a single-purpose account with no GitHub presence, no legitimate packages, and no contribution history in the real prebid project. The no-github-tag signal confirms that no git tag for v10.9.2 exists in the prebid/Prebid.js repository.
This two-version publish on September 8, 2025 overlaps with the documented DuckDB account compromise wave -- a cluster of npm supply chain attacks linked to the qix account takeover campaign first reported in September 2025.
Malicious Files
package.json is the attack artifact -- the manifest that claims the "prebid" npm name. It mirrors the legitimate prebid.js package.json with the repository URL pointing to github.com/prebid/Prebid.js, lending false authenticity. The RL scanner classified it as Text.Trojan.SupplyChain. No install hooks or malicious dependencies were added.
prebid-10.9.2.tgz is the npm distribution tarball, classified Archive-GZIP.Trojan.SupplyChain as the container for the malicious manifest.
Recommendations
Developers and security teams should take the following steps:
- Identify exposure: Check whether
prebid v10.9.2 appears in your dependency tree, including transitive dependencies. Search your lock files and installed node_modules for the exact package name "prebid" (not "prebid.js"). Any pipeline that ran npm install while either v10.9.1 or v10.9.2 was current should be reviewed.
- Update immediately: Remove "prebid" (without ".js") from any package.json and replace it with the correct "prebid.js" package from the Prebid organization.
- Inspect affected systems: No known malicious payload was injected into the copied source code; however, any environment that installed from this unauthorized publisher should be reviewed for supply chain policy violations.
- Scan your software supply chain: Use Spectra Assure Community to check whether packages in your environment have been flagged.
Indicators of Compromise
Malicious Files
| Filename | SHA256 | Detection |
|---|
| prebid-10.9.2.tgz | 44e4bb5b3ef6c9242912e5daec9a05438f03ba77bfbdc3e7495bc7143b47bfe0 | Archive-GZIP.Trojan.SupplyChain |
| package.json | 717ca6fe8d24d6e9355c4ef9d5148519deced327f3a753ea297034ac49aaa7e9 | Text.Trojan.SupplyChain |
Network IOCs
| URL / IP | Purpose |
|---|
| None | This release ships only the copied prebid.js source; no attacker-controlled network endpoints are present in the package files |
Archive Hashes
| File | SHA256 |
|---|
| prebid-10.9.2.tgz | 44e4bb5b3ef6c9242912e5daec9a05438f03ba77bfbdc3e7495bc7143b47bfe0 |
| prebid-10.9.2.tar | b878ef584966cf7ab9cb4471bcb639125dae1c64255940d72f67055955b48976 |