Grpc.Core

Problem

Software composition analysis has identified a component with one or more known severe vulnerabilities. Available threat intelligence telemetry has confirmed that the reported high or critical severity vulnerabilities are actively being exploited by malicious actors.

Problem

Software composition analysis has identified a component with one or more known vulnerabilities. Based on the CVSS scoring, these vulnerabilities have been marked as critical severity.

Problem

Uniform Resource Locators (URLs) are structured addresses that point to locations and assets on the internet. URLs allow software developers to build complex applications that exchange data with servers that can be hosted in multiple geographical regions. URLs can commonly be found embedded in documentation, configuration files, source code and compiled binaries. One or more embedded URLs were discovered to link to raw files hosted on GitHub. Attackers often abuse popular web services to host malicious payloads. Since code-sharing services URLs are typically allowed by security solutions, using them for payload delivery increases the odds that the malicious code will reach the user. While the presence of code-sharing service locations does not imply malicious intent, all of their uses in a software package should be documented and approved. An increasing number of software supply chain attacks in the open source space leverages the GitHub service to deliver malicious payloads.

Problem

Security Development Lifecycle (SDL) is a group of enhanced compile-time checks that report common coding mistakes as errors, preventing them from reaching production. These checks minimize the number of security issues by enforcing strict memory access checks. They also prevent the use of hard-to-secure string and memory manipulation functions. To prove the binary has been compiled with these checks enabled, the compiler emits a special debug object. Removing the debug table eliminates this proof. Therefore, this check only applies to binaries that still have their debug tables.

Problem

Software components sometimes need to interact with higher privilege parts of the operating system, often requiring administrative access to accomplish a task. Operating systems include a complete network stack with many services that allow the machine to connect to the internet. Some of these services are used to secure network access. For that reason, attackers often aim to tamper with system network settings. Disabling firewalls and other network security features enable the malicious code to execute without being blocked. While the presence of code that tampers with system network settings does not necessarily imply malicious intent, all of its uses in a software package should be documented and approved. Only select applications should consider using functions that interact with system network settings. One example of acceptable use for such functions is allowing specialized applications to use non-standard network ports by updating the firewall allowlist.

Problem

Control Flow Guard (CFG/CFI) protects the code flow integrity by ensuring that indirect calls are made only to vetted functions. This mitigation is detected as enabled, but its effectiveness is impacted by the use of outdated precompiled code. It was determined that the application had been linked against static libraries produced by multiple toolchain versions. Because some of them predate the general availability of the control flow guard vulnerability mitigation, it is likely that protection coverage gaps exist.

Problem

Control Flow Guard (CFG/CFI) protects the code flow integrity by ensuring that dynamic calls are made only to vetted functions. Trusted execution paths rely on the ability of the operating system to build a list of valid function targets. Certain functions can intentionally be disallowed to prevent malicious code from deactivating vulnerability mitigation features. A list of such invalid function targets can include publicly exported symbols. Applications that enhance control flow integrity through export suppression rely on libraries to mark their publicly visible symbols as suppressed. This is done for all symbols that are considered to be sensitive functions, and to which access should be restricted. It is considered dangerous to mix applications that perform export suppression with libraries that do not.

Problem

Control Flow Guard (CFG/CFI) protects the code flow integrity by ensuring that indirect calls are made only to vetted functions. This mitigation protects dynamically resolved function targets by instrumenting the code responsible for transferring execution control. Higher-level programming languages implement structured exception handling by managing their own code flow execution paths. As such, they are subject to code flow hijacking during runtime. Language-specific exception handling mitigation enforces execution integrity by instrumenting calls to manage execution context switching. Any deviation from the known and trusted code flow paths will cause the application to terminate. This makes malicious code less likely to execute.

Problem

On Linux, external symbols are resolved via the procedure linkage table (PLT) and the global offset table (GOT). Without any protection, both are writable at runtime and thus leave the executable vulnerable to pointer hijacking - an attack where the function address is overwritten with an address of a malicious function. Pointer hijacking can be mitigated by using full read-only relocations, which instruct the compiler to unify global offset tables into a single read-only table. This requires that all external function symbols are resolved at load-time instead of during execution, and may increase loading time for large programs.

Problem

Digital signatures are applied to applications, packages and documents as a cryptographically secured authenticity record. Signatures verify the origin and the integrity of the object they apply to. The integrity validation relies on the cryptographic strength of the encryption and the hash verification algorithm. If either of the two is considered weak by current standards, there is a chance the signed object could be maliciously modified, without triggering the integrity failure check.