fintech

Problem

Data Execution Prevention (DEP/NX) is a vulnerability mitigation option that prevents data from being interpreted as code anywhere within the application. This mitigation protects the application stack, heap and other memory data ranges. Executable files that fail to implement this mitigation expose the user to increased risks of malicious code injection.

Problem

Sensitive executable memory regions should be kept as read-only to protect the integrity of trusted execution code flow paths. Imported function addresses are pointers to the symbols that implement the application-required functionality. If those pointers are changed by malicious code, execution paths can be redirected to unintended locations. Most modern programming language toolchains protect those memory regions appropriately. These issues are commonly reported for outdated linkers and non-compliant executable packing solutions.

Problem

Sensitive executable memory regions should be kept as read-only to protect the integrity of trusted execution code flow paths. Thread local storage (TLS) callbacks are pointers to code initialization and resource release functions. If those pointers are changed by malicious code, execution paths can be redirected to unintended locations. Most modern programming language toolchains protect those memory regions appropriately. These issues are commonly reported for outdated linkers and non-compliant executable packing solutions.

Problem

Software composition analysis has identified a component with one or more known vulnerabilities. Based on the CVSS scoring, these vulnerabilities have been marked as high severity.

Problem

Buffer overrun protection on Linux is achieved in two ways. The most common solution is to use the stack canary (also called cookie). The stack canary is a special value written onto the stack that allows the operating system to detect and terminate the program if a stack overrun occurs. In most cases, compilers will apply the stack canary conservatively in order to avoid a negative performance impact. Therefore, stack canaries are often used together with another stack overrun mitigation - fortified functions. Fortified functions are usually wrappers around standard glibc functions (such as memcpy) which perform boundary checks either at compile time or run time to determine if a memory violation has occurred. The compiler needs additional context to generate such calls (for example, array size that needs to be known at compile time). Because of this, the compiler will virtually never substitute all viable functions with their fortified counterparts in complex programs. However, when combined with the stack canary, fortified functions provide a good measure of buffer overrun protection.